

# Safeguarding Privacy in the Age of Everyday XR

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## ABSTRACT

The commercialisation of extended reality (XR) devices provides new capabilities for its user, such as the ability to continuously capture their surroundings. This introduces novel privacy risks and challenges for XR users and bystanders alike. In this position paper, we use an established taxonomy of privacy to highlight its limitations when dealing with everyday XR. Our aim is to highlight a need for an update in our collective understanding of privacy risks imposed by everyday XR technology.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

As augmented, mixed, and virtual reality technologies and devices—together, typically referred to as extended reality (XR)—tend towards everyday form factors, commentators are conceptualising a future where, for instance, “we won’t be able to opt out from wearing [Augmented Reality] glasses in 2035 any more than we can opt out of owning smartphones today.” [3] While XR technology has the capacity to revolutionise personal computing—heralding new capabilities in augmented intelligence [20] and perception [5, 15, 16], telepresence [1], productivity [9], accessibility [10] and entertainment [13, 14, 19]—it also introduces significant privacy risks [2, 7].

In this position paper, we discuss the rationale behind our recently funded award from the UK’s National Research Centre on Privacy, Harm Reduction and Adversarial Influence Online (REPHRAIN), that sets out to explore:

- (1) the ways in which XR technology can have an adverse effect on the users’ and bystanders’ privacy, and
- (2) the ways in which such adverse effects could be mitigated, for instance, by raising users’ and bystanders’ awareness and providing practical mechanisms for consent.

Furthermore, by constraining our exploration to a recognised privacy taxonomy (i.e., Solove’s [2005] taxonomy of privacy) we aim to emphasise novel issues surrounding everyday XR.

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## 2 PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF EVERYDAY XR

In 2005 Solove recognised that “privacy [was] a concept in disarray” [18]. To address the new types of harm introduced by novel technologies, Solove developed a taxonomy of privacy by identifying and organising a set of related harmful activities that impinge on people in related ways. Considering an individual who is most directly affected by harmful activities—the data subject—as the centre of the conceptual model, Solove suggested four categories: (1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion.

While the principles that underpin Solove’s [2005] taxonomy of privacy remain relevant today, the technological landscape has progressed considerably since 2005; suggesting there may be a need for an update in the taxonomy to capture novel risks and harms introduced by novel technologies, such as everyday XR. For instance, when considering information collection, new types of (contextual) data can be collected using state-of-the-art XR headsets’ sensors (e.g., via wide angle depth/LiDAR-type sensing that enables the sensing of the data subject’s environment, body and actions [11, 12, 17], including information regarding the presence and actions of others in the vicinity of the data subject [6, 8]). Furthermore, the amount of data collected about an individual is likely on a scale that was previously unimaginable. Similarly, when considering information processing, the types of processing enabled by emerging computing paradigms (e.g., machine learning and artificial intelligence), and the speed with which the processing can take place, will likely exacerbate privacy challenges.

It is only logical then to assume, given the types and amount of data collection and processing enabled in the context of everyday XR, the types and the severity of the invasion towards individuals will likely be on a much larger scale with higher impact on the individual and consequently on the society as a whole.

We present three specific instances where Solove’s [2005] taxonomy may need updating.

### 2.1 Privacy in public spaces

Historically, there has been a contrast in how public and private spaces are treated with regards to privacy. For instance, in the legal context, typically an individual only has *reasonable expectation of privacy* in a private space. In other words, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public space [18].

This interpretation of privacy may have been sufficient in the past, where individuals did not have easy access to surveillance devices. However, given the sensing capabilities of everyday XR, users will be equipped with state-of-the-art sensors enabling them to record others, continuously and persistently in public spaces. This raises legal challenges that need to be addressed to safeguard the privacy of an individual in a public space.

## 2.2 Users vs. bystanders vs. passersby

While Solove's [2005] conceptual model captures important aspects of an individual's privacy, it fails to distinguish between various potential roles of the individual. This is particularly relevant in the context of everyday XR, where a different protocol—for data collection, processing, and dissemination—may be required, based on whether the individual is the primary user of a given XR device—with some degree of access to the device's sensors—a bystander, who may be to some degree engaged with and aware of the XR activities of the user—or a passerby, with potentially no knowledge of XR-related activities. Even in a scenario where a majority adopt everyday XR (e.g., [3]), there will remain a percentage of the population without access to such a technology (either by choice or e.g., because they are unable to afford it). This likely causes a gap in recording/surveillance capabilities of individuals. Furthermore, even a user of everyday XR will play the role of a bystander or a passerby in relation to another person's everyday XR equipment.

Given that use-cases of everyday XR likely involve wearing them in public spaces, the way in which consent regarding information collection, processing, and dissemination is negotiated, between a device user and their bystanders and passersby raises novel challenges.

## 2.3 Information dissemination with everyday XR

While dissemination of information, as described by Solove, captures harmful activities regarding “the spreading or transfer of personal data or the threat to do so”, the unique ways in which everyday XR can facilitate this is missing. For instance, while *distortion* generally consists of disseminating false or misleading information about individuals, in the context of everyday XR, distortion can consist of visually distorting an individual's facial and physical features, for instance using augmented reality, or diminished reality.

## 3 SAFELY UNLOCKING THE BENEFITS OF XR

Given the potential positive impact that XR can have on the individual and on the society, if privacy risks are identified and addressed early on, we propose two avenues to harden XR technology against violations of privacy:

- (1) **Supporting resistance against surveillance and misuse** – bringing transparency and accountability to the use of XR sensing, and making it harder for applications to knowingly or unknowingly abuse XR's capacity for surveillance. To do this, we propose exploring novel XR sensing API architectures that facilitate both enhanced data access protections, and increased user awareness regarding how, when, and to what purpose personal sensing is being used.
- (2) **Facilitating bystander awareness and consent** – We propose examining the ways in which bystanders' awareness can be raised regarding the activities of nearby XR headsets that result in bystanders' data being collected and processed. We further, propose exploring practical mechanisms by which bystanders can grant or deny consent to said activity.

In this project, our aim is to identify potential privacy risks introduced by everyday XR and to explore the ways in which these problems can be addressed before mass adoption takes place. We argue that by not identifying and addressing the privacy problems unique to XR devices, we run the risk of facilitating mis-use and abuse e.g., bestowing super sensory capabilities upon malicious actors and harming the security and privacy of individuals; which could lead once more towards societal rejection of this powerful technology [4].

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