

All Too Real: A Typology of User Vulnerabilities in Extended Reality*

User Vulnerabilities in Extended Reality

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ABSTRACT

The metaverse promises to blur digital and physical boundaries of communication, presenting novel contexts of previously contended risks. We present a typology of individual and relational vulnerabilities in networked XR, proposing examples of threats to users' agency, safety, and privacy.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI)

KEYWORDS

Extended reality, Privacy, Agency, Safety, Vulnerability

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1 Introduction

Recent accounts of an impending metaverse anticipate an adoption and usage of extended reality (XR) that is ubiquitous, networked, and regularly engaged with by the general public, blurring the boundaries between offline and online experience [1, 2]. This vision foresees the application of and reliance on XR technologies across different social domains, whether formal workplace exchanges, professional and commercial services, or casual hangouts. Even non-social communications or solitary experiences — such as news and entertainment — are expected to take on a more immersive

character, likely with direct consequences for how users consume, process, evaluate, and share content. As such, this vision of the metaverse, broadly defined, is one in which XR technologies will merge the best affordances and worst harms of face-to-face (F2F) communication, computer-mediated communication (CMC), and human-computer interaction (HCI) into a singular digital user experience.

Notably, enthusiasts often emphasize the key special affordances of XR technologies that will permit such a vision to come to fruition. In particular, they highlight the uniquely high levels of spatial and social presence conferred by such technologies [3, 4], which can lead users to feel physically located within digital environments or co-located with wholly virtual objects and the digital representations of other users from anywhere in the world. However, such immersive experiences, whether social or solitary, may also present certain threats to users' wellbeing. What such bullish accounts often fail to note is that — to the extent that it serves to mediate various forms of F2F communication or substitute direct experience with immersive simulation — the initial success and long-term prosperity of the metaverse will not hinge solely upon the degree of presence inherently afforded. Equally requisite, if not more so, will be the ability to elicit users' trust — namely, trust in their ability to freely and safely share information and trust in the fidelity and credibility of the immersive content they experience.

Whether socializing with other users, accessing and consuming certain content, or even simply operating the associated XR hardware itself, engaging with the metaverse will require users to share information about themselves of variable breadth and depth of sensitivity. In both offline and online environments, users implicitly engage in a privacy calculus to compare the perceived benefits (e.g., self-expression, social rewards) and risks (e.g., privacy violations) of sharing information [5]. As a venue for mediated-yet-incredibly-vivid interpersonal exchanges, the metaverse will require that users consider this trade-off under entirely new circumstances: the digitalization of rich, multimodal behaviors akin to those found offline will include system tracking of a variety of user inputs — verbal, gestural, semantic, biometric — and rendering them on screen to other users. Users will

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need to trust that the information they expressly disclose and implicitly provide will be safely shared — whether computationally or conversationally — in a manner that does not place privacy at risk.

Beyond confidence in the security of the information they disclose, users will also need to trust the information they consume. In XR, social exchanges often consist of virtual representations that may or may not genuinely reflect users' real-world selves, simultaneously affording creative self-expression as well as deception. Even in non-social contexts, the immersive character of the metaverse will pose risks for users. Immersion within a mediated message is thought to augment media effects through a heightened sense of presence, such that the messages encountered are all the more impactful. While there has been a good deal of popular press and empirical work into the prosocial outcomes of XR [6-8] there has been virtually no attention given to the capacity of XR technology to amplify less desirable effects. In an age of fake news and misinformation, the plausibility [9] and sense of “being there” [10-11] conferred to messages conveyed through XR may enhance implicit trust in depicted content, regardless of authenticity, credibility, or accuracy.

Thus, popular accounts of an impending metaverse instantiated through XR technologies entail a platform in which users may run the risk of several different threats. In an effort to inform and guide future technology design and policy research on the metaverse, this project seeks to provide a framework for typologizing the variety of vulnerabilities users may face. In doing so, it centers the notion of *vulnerability*, defining the metaverse not solely as a technology, but an institution capable of fostering particular types of vulnerable situations for users [12]. Similar to privacy [13], vulnerability has been studied at *individual, relational, and institutional* levels [14]. With respect to the metaverse, the latter is primarily a matter of system infrastructure (e.g., cybersecurity); in contrast, this piece focuses on individual and relational vulnerabilities — that is, the user experience affordances of a metaverse implemented through XR technologies and the associated threats to those users. In particular, individual and relational vulnerabilities — which can be exacerbated as a result of technological immersion — are likely to pose a range of threats to users' *agency, privacy and safety*. We briefly present examples of each of these threats, in an effort to spark conversations around the looming challenges to be faced in the metaverse as well as help identify and organize avenues for future research.

2 Individual Vulnerabilities

While many proposed use cases focus on social interaction and exploration, the metaverse will inherently subject users to individual vulnerability. This vulnerability may arise as a product of user status (e.g., children need special protections) or a lack of knowledge that renders users defenseless against institutional power [15].

2.1 Individual Agency

As part of an impending metaverse, XR technologies will increasingly permit users to experience content such as news, advertisements, and social media posts from within a message itself. To the extent that “seeing is believing,” what might be the ramifications of spatially occupying a message? Similar to native advertisements, being perceptually immersed within a message may implicitly impair users' ability to discern authenticity, credibility, and authorial intent. This presents new levels of concern with respect to harmful messaging, such as disinformation or predatory content. Further, it has been suggested that by readily precluding juxtaposition of competing worldviews (literally), the immersive character of XR spaces may have “an unlegislated power to shape our politics” [16]. In these respects, users' capacity to critically evaluate the ideas they encounter in XR may be restricted.

In addition, individual agency is likely to be threatened as a result of the metaverse's inherently surveillant nature. Studies have concluded that surveillance chills behavior online and offline, stymieing individual agency in that users hide their authentic personality and behavior under the assumption that they are being watched, whether it be by institutional actors or other users [17]. Additionally, the technologies and techniques of surveillance capitalism, recently termed “surveillance technicity,” minimize negative affective states so that users continue engaging, driving them further away from self-determination [18].

2.2 Individual Privacy

While privacy acts as a “shield” in the way of discovery or rendering vulnerability, it also can hide vulnerability [15]. For instance, privacy protections may inhibit a user from reporting an inappropriate encounter in the metaverse. A lack of privacy also creates vulnerability, as certain information required to enjoy services within the metaverse may also make users more vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. In the metaverse, it is imagined that a user can engage with their body and voice in real-time. The metaverse extends the panoptic nature of traditional online mediums from measuring behavior through clicks to that closely resembling offline behavior, including non-verbal data which increases targeting and monetization potential [19]. Unlike other online mediums, XR technology may reduce anonymity and invisibility through the inclusion of additional information channels, such as voice or avatar, as default elements of the interface [20]. While many do not care about their online privacy, claiming that they have “nothing to hide,” [21] this argument may be substantially weakened when a wider assortment of offline behaviors becomes digitized.

2.3 Individual Safety

The metaverse extends a looming threat to individual safety which already exists in online spaces. For example,

given that XR has already been leveraged for educational and pediatric purposes [19], designers can anticipate its use by children, thus requiring implementation of special protections that satisfy the requirements of relevant laws such as the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). While COPPA requires verifiable parental consent for use of online platforms, the FTC recognizes that it is nearly impossible to account for children lying about their age or forging consent mechanisms [22]. This becomes increasingly problematic when children are immersed in an environment that resembles the offline world, putting them directly at risk of safety harms, including being exposed to explicit content or coming into contact with dangerous actors.

An additional safety concern within the metaverse is that produced by dark patterns, or design intended to manipulate users toward a particular decision which maximizes shareholder value [23]. While dark patterns have been widely studied with respect to online environments at large, less is known about the operation of dark patterns in XR in particular.

3 Relational Vulnerabilities

The metaverse intends to be not only a space governing asymmetrical information exchange between individuals and corporate actors, but also one where interpersonal communication can thrive. The metaverse is expected to foster new levels of social presence in mediated exchanges — with humans and AI agents alike — as all manner of everyday real-world interactions, such as in-store shopping [24] or team meetings [25], are ported to XR. While social XR interactions are currently understudied [26], there are several plausible relational vulnerabilities posed by such settings which might guide considerations for research and design.

3.1 Relational Agency

The relational threat to agency in the metaverse may be caused by a lack of trust or knowledge about information flows. While anthropomorphic cues which engender social presence have been found to heighten trust [24, 27] and information control [28], they also produce feelings of surveillance in creating a direct gaze on participants [27]. With respect to information flows, when users perceive communication to be ephemeral, they are more motivated to disclose personal information [29]. However, it is unclear what perceptions of ephemerality will exist in the metaverse with prospective digital information exchanges that are meant to mirror F2F offline interactions.

3.2 Relational Privacy

Compared to current online communications, XR exchanges will present new contexts for sensitive self-disclosure and lateral surveillance, diminishing relational privacy and enabling further interpersonal and institutional

context collapse. This is particularly dangerous within an immersive digital environment where users may feel as though they can behave and interact with others as they do in offline settings. Further, it remains unknown how users will be able to delineate human users from artificially-created bots, which is particularly important given that the latter can encourage the same degree of intimate self-disclosure as the former [30]. Thus, metaverse experiences pose a particular threat to privacy management, as the wider assortment of user data conveyed — explicitly or implicitly through embodied virtual interactions — may be shared beyond intended privacy boundaries.

3.3 Relational Safety

The anonymity and invisibility provided in online exchanges can lead to disinhibition, both benign and toxic [31]. In the metaverse, it is predicted that users will be similarly disinhibited, however, receivers and bystanders may experience the consequences of this disinhibition to a more realistic degree. For example, negative anti-social behaviors such as cyberbullying and harassment will continue to present psychological harm to users. It is possible that negative online disinhibition common to traditional online spaces will be mitigated by the richness of embodied XR representations and the resulting impressions of others as real, fully-formed persons; however, recent accounts of harassment and assault in XR settings suggests this may not be the case [32]. Thus, it is essential for designers of the metaverse to prepare for the prevention of toxic disinhibition in order to protect user safety in social settings.

4 Conclusion

Given recent accounts, including vision statements from firms invested in XR technologies, the metaverse is a near-term prospect. Amid the excitement and optimism, designers and users should duly attend to clear threats to both individual and relational vulnerabilities. The aforementioned typology is a starting point which maintains that these vulnerabilities can be conceptualized as threats to agency, privacy and safety. Notably, the current list of vulnerabilities is not exhaustive; rather, it serves as a launching point for continued discussion. We look forward to sharing this initial typology with the CHI community, drawing upon their insights and feedback as we refine this list as a tool for guiding future academic research, design, and platform policy considerations.

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